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The recent ﬁnancial crisis poses the challenge to understand how systemic risk arises
endogenously and what architecture can make the ﬁnancial system more resilient to global
crises. This paper shows that a ﬁnancial network can be most resilient for intermediate levels
of risk diversiﬁcation, and not when this is maximal, as generally thought so far. This ﬁnding
holds in the presence of the ﬁnancial accelerator, i.e. when negative variations in the
ﬁnancial robustness of an agent tend to persist in time because they have adverse effects on
the agent’s subsequent performance through the reaction of the agent’s counterparties.
& 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has shown that systemic risk has been dramatically underestimated (Bartram et al., 2007).
Understanding the nature of systemic risk is crucial if appropriate policy responses are to be framed, especially since the impact
of ﬁnancial shocks on the real economy increases with the depth of the ﬁnancial system (Kroszner et al., 2007). Moreover, it has
been recognized that ﬁnancial crises are characterized by the procyclicality of balance sheets and leverage across ﬁnancial
institutions. This is the case especially when they get connected to each other in the process of originating and distributing
securities (Brunnermeier, 2008; Morris and Shin, 2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). In general, ﬁnancial ties of various types
among institutions have in principle an ambiguous effect, since they allow for the diversiﬁcation of risk, but open also the door
to ﬁnancial contagion (Allen and Gale, 2001). There is strong empirical evidence that in the unraveling of the recent crisis,
contagion played a large role, propagated primarily through liquidity and risk-premium channels (Longstaff, 2010). The recent
ﬁnancial crisis has brought to the fore the crucial question of the relationship between the architecture of the global ﬁnancial
system and systemic risk (Allen et al., 2011). The common view in the literature has been so far that the beneﬁcial effect of
diversiﬁcation always prevails and more integrated systems are more resilient (Allen and Gale, 2001). In contrast, a very recent
stream of work has found conditions on the propagation of ﬁnancial contagion and bankruptcies so that full risk diversiﬁcation
or full ﬁnancial integration is not optimal (Allen et al., 2011; Castiglionesi and Navarro, 2010; Wagner, 2010; Stiglitz, 2010,
forthcoming).ll rights reserved.
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evolution of ﬁnancial robustness. We show that, in the presence of ﬁnancial acceleration and persistence – i.e. when the
variations in the level of ﬁnancial robustness of institutions tend to persist in time or get ampliﬁed – the probability of
default does not decrease monotonically with diversiﬁcation. As a result, the ﬁnancial network is most resilient for an
intermediate level of connectivity.
Our work is related to several streams of the literature. We follow the standard approach in ﬁnance of modeling the
default of one ﬁrm as a problem of ﬁrst passage time in a stochastic diffusion process representing the valuation of
corporate liabilities (Merton, 1974; Black and Cox, 1976; Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995). In particular, the index
representing the distance to default or the level of creditworthiness (Hull and White, 2000) is assumed to evolve over
time as a stochastic differential equation (SDE) with a lower absorbing barrier, so that the ﬁrm defaults when the index
value becomes zero (or hits from above a positive ‘‘bankruptcy’’ threshold). In addition, one can compute numerically the
probability of joint default of several ﬁrms in the presence of correlations among their level of creditworthiness (Hull and
White, 2001; Zhou, 1997). However, key to the analysis of systemic risk is the endogenous determination of correlations
arising from the external effects that the distress of an agent causes to her counterparties.
Several types of external effects have been investigated in the literature. On the one hand, the failure of one bank
adversely affects other banks—ﬁnancial contagion (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Allen and Gale, 2001; Stiglitz and
Greenwald, 2003). This, in turn, can occur through several channels: (a) bank runs—where the failure of one bank induces
depositors of other banks to withdraw their funds; (b) interbank lending—where the failure of one bank implies that
others will not be fully repaid; and (c) real economic activity—where the failure of one bank has adverse effects on other
bank borrowers, lowering their probability of repayment. On the other hand, agents may be adversely affected by the
depreciation of a common asset—asset price contagion (Kiyotaki and Moore, 2002, 1997). Again, this can occur through
several channels, the most important of which may be through the value of collateral, the impact of reduced collateral
values on borrowing capacity, and thereby on real activity. Asset price contagion can also have more direct effects, e.g.,
through real wealth effects. All these mechanisms represent independent contagion channels which may interact during
the development of a ﬁnancial crisis. For instance, the default of a bank may trigger an avalanche of deposit withdrawals at
other banks as well as a liquidity evaporation on the interbank market.
This paper focuses on credit inter-linkages. Credit contracts establish connections among banks on the interbank market,
among ﬁrms and banks on the market for loans, among customers and suppliers in the market for trade credit. In other words,
the credit market can be conceived of as a credit network in which nodes represent agents and links represent credit
relationships. To complicate the picture further, banks are also connected to ﬁnancial intermediaries in the so-called shadow
banking system, while ﬁnancial products such as credit default swaps establish ﬁnancial ties between the seller of protection
and the reference entity. The most inﬂuential example of network analysis applied to the propagation of distress in a credit
network is the seminal paper by Allen and Gale (2001) on ‘‘ﬁnancial contagion’’, which has triggered a signiﬁcant body of work,
both on interbank credit (Freixas et al., 2000; Furﬁne, 2003; Boss et al., 2004; Elsinger et al., 2006; Iori et al., 2006; Nier et al.,
2007), as well as on bank–ﬁrm or ﬁrm–ﬁrm credit (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003; Boissay, 2006; Battiston et al., 2007).
To capture the interdependence among banks that arises from these network relationships, we model the evolution of
the levels of ﬁnancial robustness – meant as an equity ratio – of different agents as coupled stochastic processes, similar to
Hull and White (2001). Much of the earlier literature was directed at valuing corporate liabilities. In contrast, our objective
is to understand the interplay of ﬁnancial interdependence among banks and ﬁnancial acceleration in the emergence of
systemic risk. We assume banks’ equity levels (and thus the levels of ﬁnancial robustness) are subject to idiosyncratic
shocks, along the lines of previous works (Allen and Gale, 2001; Allen and Babus, 2009; Allen et al., 2011; Wagner, 2010;
Castiglionesi and Navarro, 2010). Thus, banks have an incentive to engage in risk sharing by ﬁnancing the liabilities of
other banks. This reduces the ﬂuctuations on the value of their asset portfolio and hence their failure probability and
associated risk premia. To model this, we consider a set of banks in which balance sheets are interconnected in a network
of liabilities, following the framework of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Shin (2008).
On the other hand, as we have noted, connections entail a negative effect, through contagion. Results on systemic risk
can be sensitive to the exact way in which contagion is modeled. It is often assumed that the bankruptcy of one bank may
cause the failure of all k connected banks (Stiglitz, 2010; Castiglionesi and Navarro, 2010). In an alternative setting, banks
are assumed to be funded by investors, which upon the observation of a signal – the news that at least one bank will fail –
decide whether to roll over the loans (Allen et al., 2011). If they do not roll over, then all banks have to liquidate. Notice
that in either case the failure of one bank may trigger the failure of k banks, and so systemic risk increases with the
connectivity of that bank. It is clear however that the diversiﬁcation of the portfolios of counterparties of the failing bank
lowers the likelihood of their failure. Thus, it is important to take into account the fact that ﬁnancial ties are conducive of
ﬁnancial damage only proportionately to their relative weight in the portfolio of counterparties. On the other hand, we
need to recognize that negative effects from one bank to another can arise well before the level of bankruptcy is reached.
For instance, the fear of failure for a bank intertwined with another bank that faces a high risk of failure will drive up the
interest rate which the former has to pay.
Because our model is dynamic and in continuous time, it allows us to consider the effect of variations in ﬁnancial
robustness from one bank to the others, rather than focusing solely on bankruptcy events. Moreover, in our model, the
reason why we obtain an increase in the failure probability as connectivity increases is more subtle than in earlier
contagion models and emerges from a milder assumption. We assume that counterparties of a bank are able to observe
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they take actions which penalize the bank. What is perceived as normal by the counterparties is the typical magnitude of
the ﬂuctuations of bank’s robustness, as measured by its standard deviation s (in the absence of previous penalizations).
When counterparties react, this translates in an immediate, further, drop in the bank’s ﬁnancial robustness by a magnitude
a. This assumption is meant to capture the adverse effect that may arise, for instance, because those providing credit
increase the interest rate charged (Bernanke et al., 1999). Another situation is when some short-term creditors decide to
hoard liquidity and not to roll over their funds, forcing the agent to ﬁre-sell some assets in order to pay back the debts
(Brunnermeier, 2008). In OTC derivative contracts, a drop in the level of ﬁnancial robustness can trigger a collateral margin
call, so the agent is forced to quickly free up some capital in order to honor the call. All these situations entail an additional
cost for the agent, and thus a further reduction of its ﬁnancial robustness.
The ratio a=s between the amplitude of the adverse effect and the ﬂuctuation amplitude plays a crucial role. It is clear
that if a5s, then the penalization does not affect the probability of a further penalization, because the probability of a
penalization is dominated by the random shocks. In contrast, if a4s, then it is likely that in the next time step the
counterparties will observe another variation more negative than normal, and will react again. This chain of events may
continue for several quarters in a row. We call trend reinforcement this particular form of persistence of ﬁnancial distress.
Notice that because of the random ﬂuctuations, the chain will break as soon as the bank is hit by a shock positive and large
enough to overcome the effect of the previous penalization. It follows that, as the ratio a=s increases, once the bank has
been caught in the trend reinforcement, the probability to escape decreases and the probability to default increases.
Since, we exclude by assumption systematic shocks to the industry, then shocks on ﬁnancial robustness of agents come
solely from the idiosyncratic returns on their projects. This implies that when agents engage in risk sharing with other k




, under the assumptions that shocks are
uncorrelated. Counterparties of each agent are assumed to observe this and to base their perception of ‘‘normality’’ on
the distribution of shocks in that environment.
Thus, when penalization by counterparties is ruled out by assumption, then with smaller shocks it takes longer for the
robustness to hit the default barrier. In this case, diversiﬁcation is beneﬁcial. In contrast, when penalization is possible, and
if the magnitude a of the penalization is constant (or scales down with k more slowly than s), then it is clear that with
higher diversiﬁcation the trend reinforcement is now more likely to occur and the default is reached faster. Notice that,
ex ante, the probability to incur in a penalization in the ﬁrst place is completely independent of k, because the level of
‘‘normality’’ is relative to the shock amplitude. Therefore, the model does not contain among the hypotheses any cost or
disadvantage of diversiﬁcation.
Notice that the case in which a remains constant with k is a common situation that can arise in the presence of
indivisibilities and ﬁxed costs in the transactions. For instance, if the counterparties increase the interest rate charged to
the agent by a ﬁxed amount. Similarly, if an OTC derivative counterparty requires a ﬁxed amount of additional collateral.
In general, there is also another effect which makes diversiﬁcation even more problematic. As agents get connected in a
network, their portfolios become more similar and shocks hitting the portfolio values become more and more correlated
(Allen et al., 2011). The correlation among shocks on portfolios results in correlation across agents’ levels of ﬁnancial
robustness so their trajectories tend over time to remain close to each other. This implies that, conditional on one agent
reaching the default level, it is more likely that several other agents are also about to default. In other words, with higher
diversiﬁcation, systemic defaults, conditional to having at least one default are more probable.1 Notice that this holds in
general as it follows solely from the correlation. In the presence of ﬁnancial acceleration, the effect is stronger because it is
more likely that a shared negative shock ampliﬁes an already negative trend.2
What we have described so far is an evolution of ﬁnancial robustness which one can think of as occurring at the time
scale of months. Every quarter, balance sheets are revealed, ratings of ﬁrms are revised and ﬁnancial ratios of those holding
their liabilities move up or down. However, in the acute phase of the unraveling of a crisis, some agents default on their
obligations, some assets are written down and this may cause other agents to default, thus triggering a cascade which
evolves at the time scale of days and is usually mitigated by the intervention of the central bank. Accordingly, in the
second part of this paper, we analyze the dynamics of failure cascades. There is a large and growing literature on failure
cascades, since the earlier work of Allen and Gale (2001) and Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003). We follow an approach that is
similar to the ﬁctitious sequential default introduced by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and in line with Gai and Kapadia (2010).
When an agent defaults, the loss for its counterparties is assumed to be proportional to their relative exposure to it. A
fraction of this loss can be in principle recovered by selling debtor’s assets, but not in the very short term. Under some
regularity assumptions on the structure of the network and the independence of defaults, it is possible to compute the
expected size of the default cascade. We can then show that the probability of large cascades in the system is also not
monotonically decreasing with the level of diversiﬁcation. However, unlike other default cascade models, here cascades
are investigated in combination with the slower dynamics of ﬁnancial robustness. In summary, our results indicate that1 The joint default probability, conditional to the occurrence of one or more default, should not be confused with the probability of default we have
discussed in the earlier paragraphs.
2 Even in a static context of two connected agents, Wagner (2010) ﬁnds a similar adverse effect of diversiﬁcation, resulting from the assumption that
the ‘‘loss is larger when agents have to liquidate at the same time’’. In contrast, in our model, we do not consider the cost of the crisis. High diversiﬁcation
is not desirable simply because it leads to larger but also more frequent crises.
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liabilities, the ﬁnancial system becomes very unstable and prone to frequent and large crises.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model of the evolution of ﬁnancial robustness and the
results on the probability of individual defaults. Section 3 describes the dynamics of default cascade and the probability of
systemic defaults. Section 4 concludes.
2. A dynamic model of ﬁnancial robustness
In this section we introduce a minimalistic dynamic model describing the evolution of the ﬁnancial robustness of
agents connected in a network of credit relations. Similar to Hull and White (2001) and Zhou (1997), ﬁnancial robustness
of agent i plays here the role of an indicator of the agent’s creditworthiness or distance to default. We think of it as an
equity to total asset ratio and we denote it as Zi 2 ½0;1, with Zi ¼ 0 indicating bankruptcy. In line with the literature on the
distance to default, we formulate the model in terms of a system of stochastic differential equations (SDEs) describing the
evolution in time of all the Zi. The interest of this approach comes from the possibility of applying well-known standard
methods to compute the expected ﬁrst passage time at 0 and thus the probability of default of an agent taking into account
the dynamics of the other agents.3
2.1. Financial acceleration
Our aim is to develop a model that captures at the same time two important mechanisms present in a ﬁnancial
network. The ﬁrst mechanism, which we call ﬁnancial acceleration, refers to the fact that current variations in equity
depend on past variations in equity itself. This occurs in at least two scenarios. In the ﬁrst one (see e.g., in Morris and Shin,
2008), an agent is hit by a shock due to a loss of market value of some securities in her portfolio. If such shock is large
enough, so that some of her creditors claim their funds back, the agent is forced to liquidate at least part of her portfolio to
reimburse debt. If the securities are sold below the market price, the asset side of the balance sheet decreases more than
the liability side and the agent’s fragility – i.e. leverage – goes up unintentionally. This situation can lead to a spiral of
losses and decreasing robustness. At a macro-economic level, this corresponds to the procyclical nature of leverage (Morris
and Shin, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2008; Brunnermeier and Pederson, 2009). A second scenario is the one in which when the
agent is hit by a shock at time t, her creditors make credit conditions harsher at tþ1. Indeed, it is well documented that
lenders ask a higher external ﬁnance premium when the borrowers’ ﬁnancial conditions worsen (Bernanke et al., 1999).
Stricter credit conditions can be considered an additional shock hitting the borrower in tþ1.
If we translate this idea in terms of SDE (Gardiner, 2004; Oksendal and Karsten, 1998), the ﬁnancial acceleration can be
seen as a jump term that depends on the past realizations of robustness itself. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict here
the dependence at time t on the past only to one point in time tt (with t40). We have in mind a situation in which the
robustness of an agent evolves daily, due to the change in market value of its assets. However, typically, the conditional
shock associated with ﬁnancial acceleration occurs each quarter, when the ﬁnancial situation of the agent is made public
and, for instance, the rating of the agent is revised downwards.
Therefore, we assume that a jump possibly occurs only at each discrete time t 2 N , depending on the past realization of
robustness at the discrete time tt (with t 2 N ). We then have the following jump-diffusion equation:






In the above equations s is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shocks hitting agent i, dxi denotes the Wiener
process and dðt0tÞ is the Dirac delta-function.4
We further assume that i’s partners react whenever there is a decrease of i’s robustness perceived as ‘‘atypical’’, given
the current market conditions. In other words, the penalty depends only on the change in robustness and not on its
absolute level.5 Thus, we deﬁne
hðtÞ ¼ a if ZiðtdtÞZiðtdttÞoEst,
0 otherwise

ð3Þ3 Indeed, if we were to focus exclusively on the present discounted value of the bankruptcy costs, we would only need to study the value of the
moment generating function of the ﬁrst passage time.
4 By deﬁnition then, the integral
R tþdt
tdt dt0 ,t dt
0 equals 1 on any interval including t and equals 0 on any interval not including t. This means that in Eq.
(2) the jump contributes to the variation of Zi only at discrete times.
5 There are of course other ways to model how partners react to the signal of distress coming from i, resulting in various functional forms of h.
Another option would be for instance to assume that a penalty is triggered whenever the ﬁrm robustness goes below a certain threshold. This however,
requires to make a choice about the proportion of ﬁrms that are initially born above or below such a threshold, thus complicating the scenario. A general
investigation of the impact of the functional form of h would be certainly of interest but is beyond the scope of the present work.
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The parameters E and a represent, respectively, the sensitivity of counterparties’ reaction, and the amplitude of the effect of
such a reaction on i’s robustness. The deﬁnition above implies that the counterparties of i react only when an adverse
shock to i is large enough to cause a negative variation of robustness that exceeds, in absolute value, E times the standard
deviation of the shocks, st—in other words, the shock is perceived as ‘‘atypical’’. When the counterparties do react, the
reaction act as a penalty causing a decrease of magnitude a in i’s robustness.6 Indeed, whether creditors refuse to roll over
debt, or they increase the interest rate charged to i, the overall effect is an additional cost and thus a further decrease of i’s
robustness. Thus, Eq. (3) is a simple way to model, in a reduced form, the chain of events described earlier in the two
scenarios where ﬁnancial acceleration is at work. We will refer to the repercussion for i a magnitude a, as penalty and/or as
conditional shock.
A large ﬁnancial robustness implies also a low leverage. Agents have no incentive to keep an indeﬁnitely large equity
ratio. Thus, we assume that robustness does not exceed an upper reﬂective barrier at Zmax. Bankruptcy occurs when
robustness falls below a given threshold Zmin, modeled, as usually done, as a lower absorbing barrier. Thus, over time the
agent goes bankrupt when robustness hits the lower barrier and is replaced by a new agent, with a new initial value of
robustness Z0. The time to default depends on the value of Z0, where the process starts, relative to the extremes of the
interval ½Zmin Zmax. Without loss of generality, we set Zmin ¼ 0, Zmax ¼ 1 and we focus on the most conservative case of
Z0 ¼ 1.
Notice that Eq. (3) is likely to underestimate the level of acceleration that occurs in a real situation. We could expect
that when agent i’s robustness gets closer to the default threshold, the reaction of the partners, and its effect, increases in
amplitude, and thus that a is a function of Z, with a0ðZÞo0. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a constant, which is a
conservative scenario. In any case, what really matters is the ratio between amplitude and sensitivity as we discuss below.
In the following, we restrict to the case t¼ 1, which we interpret as conditional shocks occurring only at quarters. We
thus have st ¼ s
ﬃﬃﬃ
t
p ¼ s. Eq. (3) implies that if hðtÞ ¼a and a4Es, then, in the next quarter, the counterparties of i will
observe again a variation of robustness Zi that triggers their reaction, unless the continuous time shocks accumulated
during the interval ½t,tþ1 is positive and large enough to compensate for it. Thus, the larger the ratio a=ðEsÞ between the
amplitude of the adverse effect and the sensitivity of the counterparties, the more frequently a negative variation in
robustness will be followed by another negative variation. We refer to this effect as trend reinforcement, which is a speciﬁc
form of ampliﬁcation of ﬁnancial distress. In particular, for higher values of the ratio a=ðEsÞ, the expected time to default of
the agent is shorter.
To see this more formally, we ﬁrst note that in Eq. (3), the value of h at time t is a stochastic variable. Denote with q the
probability that hðtÞ ¼ a. There are two cases in which the event hðtÞ ¼a occurs. If hðt1Þ ¼ 0, then the shock
accumulated in ½t1dt,tdt has to be large enough (and negative). If, instead, hðt1Þ ¼a, then a smaller shock is
sufﬁcient to imply hðtÞ ¼a.7 This means that there is a positive feedback increasing the chance that hðtÞ ¼a in course of
time, up to a certain level. We can then compute the value of q in equilibrium as shown in the following proposition (see
Proof of Proposition 3).
Proposition 1. Consider the evolution of robustness of Eq. (1) in the presence of the ﬁnancial acceleration deﬁned by Eq. (3).








where F is the Gaussian cumulative distribution.
In equilibrium, the expected value of h over time is of course aq, which means that the average effect of the trend
reinforcement jumps is equivalent to a negative drift. This drift is stronger, the larger the a is with respect to Es.
In the following, we are interested in the expected value of the ﬁrst passage time of the system. In this respect, the
average effect of the jump is well approximated by the effect of a constant drift.8 In contrast with a model with a time-
delay dependent jumps, a model with constant drift is analytically tractable. Therefore, based on their equivalence from
the point of view of expected ﬁrst passage time, from now on we model the ﬁnancial acceleration simply as a constant drift
term and rewrite Eq. (1) as follows:
dZi ¼aqðs,a,EÞ dtþs dxi ð5Þ
As the intuition suggests, the stronger the acceleration, the sooner the ﬁrms reach the default threshold, as stated in the
following proposition.6 Notice that in the deﬁnition above, we want the counterparties to compare the current robustness to the one at the previous quarter, right before
the possible occurrence of the penalty at the previous quarter. This is the reason of the tdt and ttdt.
7 Notice that in Eq. (3) the value of h(t) depends on the realizations of the Wiener process in the interval ½tdt1,tdt and it is independent of the
realizations of the Wiener process in the interval of ½tdt,tþ1dt.
8 See in Appendix the numerical simulations supporting this claim.
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acceleration deﬁned by Eq. (3). Then, the probability of default increases monotonically with the intensity a of the ﬁnancial
acceleration.2.2. Interdependence
A priori it is not clear at all how the default probability is affected when agents get connected in a network of contracts.
Thus, interdependence is the second mechanism we want to include in the model, namely the fact that the ﬁnancial
robustness of an agent is affected by variations in the robustness of agents connected to her by some contracts. In line with
the modeling framework introduced by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and further developed in Shin (2008), we consider a set
of n agents connected in a network of obligations. This is described by a liability matrix L, where Lij is the obligation of i to j
and ½L1i, . . . ,Lni is the portfolio of i. For our purposes, we are interested in the exposure matrix W, where Wij ¼ Lji=
P
kLki,
represents the weight of the obligation of j to i relative to the whole portfolio of i. Precisely, Wij measures the relative
ﬁnancial exposure of i to j, since this is the fraction of i portfolio that, at most, is at risk in case j becomes insolvent. It
follows that W is a row-stochastic matrix since the relative exposures of each agent to the others must sum up to one,
8iPjWij ¼ 1.
Formally, the relations in the network are represented by a graph G¼ ðV,EÞ, where V is a set of nodes representing the
agents and E is a set of directed edges representing the contracts (for an introduction to network theory, see, e.g., Jackson,
2008; Goyal, 2007). The graph is associated with an adjacency matrix A where Aij ¼ 0 if there is no edge from i to j and
Aij ¼ 1 if there is an edge from i to j. For the sake of convenience in matrix operations, we adopt the convention that the
edge (ij) means that agent i owns liabilities of j. The exposure matrix W corresponds to a weighted adjacency matrix with
Wij40 iff Aij ¼ 1. The out-degree of agent i is the number 1rkirn1 of out-going edges of agent i and represents the
number of counterparties or neighbors to which agent i is exposed.
In the following, we will characterize the systemic risk of the credit network for varying levels of risk diversiﬁcation.
We are interested in the situation in which the graph is connected (i.e. there is some path from any agent to any other
agent) because this means that every agent can potentially be reached by external effects. The case in which the network is
divided in disconnected clusters will be investigated in further studies. Further, we do not consider any inter-temporal
optimization of the portfolios. On the contrary, we assume that the exposures in the portfolio of each agent are
approximately balanced, i.e. Wijﬃ1=ki. This rather stylized assumption, besides simplifying the analysis, has however the
advantage of implying a conservative scenario in which risk sharing in the system is always maximized. One can expect
that results on the emergence of systemic risk should then hold a fortiori for networks where some agents are unequally
exposed to some others.
Since portfolios are equally weighted, the degree of the agent i is a rough measure of her risk diversiﬁcation level. The
ratio of the number of existing edges among agents, denoted as ‘, over the number of all possible edges, nðn1Þ, is the
density d of the network, d¼ ‘=ðnðn1ÞÞ. It represents the fraction of possible pairs of agents that are involved in a ﬁnancial
contract. A simple relation of proportionality holds between the average degree k in the network and the density
d¼ k=ðn1Þﬃk=n (for n in the range we are interested in). Thus for a ﬁxed number n of agents, the density of the network
is also a measure of the average risk diversiﬁcation across the agents.
In the following, the analysis will be carried out for the case of a regular graph, i.e. when agents have the same level k of
diversiﬁcation.9 Since i’s assets include j’s liabilities, their value must depend on the ﬁnancial conditions of j. In particular,
at least at ﬁrst order, an increase of j asset value will have a positive effect on i portfolio, while an increase of j liabilities
(meant as cost of ﬁnancing incurred by j) will have a negative effect. In other words, in a ﬁnancial network, i’s robustness
must depend on j’s robustness. However, the exact way this interdependence works is not simple and deriving a fully
ﬂedged law of motion of robustness would require to model also the decisions of agents regarding their capital structure
and in particular whether and how to reduce their liability, given their expectations on the market conditions. Our aim
here is much less ambitious and more pragmatic. We consider a ﬁrst order linear dependence between the robustness of
the agents in the networks and we investigate the implications of lower or higher risk diversiﬁcation on the default
probability. The results of this exercise provide interesting insights for future, more micro-founded works.





where we assume that robustness of each agent is subject to idiosyncratic identically distributed and normal shocks.
Within a similar framework one could also account for the case of correlated shocks. For our purposes this case will sufﬁce9 The empirical evidence on ﬁnancial networks indicate the tendency to exhibit a core–periphery structure. The core alone is quite dense and not so
heterogeneous in degree (Soramaki et al., 2007; Iori et al., 2008; Vitali et al., 2011). For this reason, the following analysis can be relevant to the core of a
ﬁnancial network, which typically is also where most of the total asset value resides.
S. Battiston et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1121–1141 1127here. Since the liabilities of agent j are held by other agents, the idiosyncratic shock hitting j is shared with the connected
agents proportionally to the relative weight of their ﬁnancial exposure to j.10
Notice that the above formulation is similar in concept to the model of Allen et al. (2011) where each agent runs an
independent project with a stochastic return and, in order to diversify their risk, agents invest in other agents’ projects. As
a result, each agent is affected by the linear combination of the shocks of her partners. However, differently from that
model, here we do not look at the return, but at the robustness of the agents. Moreover, we depart from the modeling
framework of both Allen et al. (2011) and Shin (2008) by moving to a fully dynamic setting in order to account for
variations in the level of robustness, as opposed to considering only the default event.



















where each dxjðtÞ denotes an independent Wiener process.
The beneﬁt of an agent from being connected to several other agents is that the expected ﬂuctuation on the robustness
is decreased and thus the time to hit the default barrier is longer. This follows from the fact that the linear combination of k
uncorrelated Wiener processes is still a Wiener process, denoted as dzi ¼
P
jWij dxj, with a standard deviation sz smaller










dZi ¼ ðZ iðtÞZiðtÞÞ dtþsz dzi ð9Þ
where Z i ¼
P
jWijZj is the average robustness of the neighbors of i. Notice that risk sharing and distress propagation are
two faces of the same coin. By investing in others’ liabilities each agent is sharing her own risk with them but also
accepting to be affected by the variations, positive or negative, of the robustness of the others. In bad times, when someone
in the neighborhood is badly hit by a shock, this means that the agent is exposed to a distress propagation.
2.3. Acceleration in a network context
When the agent i is in a network of risk sharing relations, her creditors will observe now a standard deviation sz in the
ﬂuctuations of its robustness that are due to shared random shocks. As before, in the case t¼ 1, we assume












is the standard deviation of the Gaussian shocks, accumulated over a time period of length 1, if
agent i engages in risk sharing with k other agents. In other words, i’s counterparties react according to the current level of
ﬂuctuation amplitude. However, it is important to emphasize that the probability that i incurs in a penalty is exactly the
same as in the previous case without risk sharing (as long as there was no penalty at the previous quarter).12
Notice also that, counterparties’ reaction on i has remained of the same amplitude, a. In other words, the magnitude of





trend reinforcement would not step in for increasing k. In this case, risk sharing has the usual positive impact on the
probability of default.
The interesting case is when the magnitude of the penalty and the magnitude of the ﬂuctuations do not scale the same
way with the number of neighbors. Here, we focus on the case in which a remains constant with k, a situation that can
arise from indivisibilities and ﬁxed costs in the transactions. For instance, if each of the counterparties of i increases the
interest rate charged to the agent by a ﬁxed amount, the effect for i is simply proportional to her total debt and is not10 In case j is not able to meet her obligation,Wij is the relative loss of iwith respect to her initial investment, thusWij should be a good proxy of how
much the variation of robustness of i are affected by the robustness of j. Notice that this may differ from the loss with respect to the value of the assets at
a later point in time. However, if the returns on the various assets do not differ too much, or one considers periods of time that are not too long, Wij is a
reasonable proxy of the relative impact on i’s asset due to a change in robustness of j. Accordingly, the shock hitting agent i affects i herself only
proportionally to the term Wii.
11 Notice that Eq. (6) implies that the robustness of an agent is not the result of a simultaneous computation of robustness of all agents. Instead, it is
affected by the change in robustness of the counterparties at the previous period. This is similar to what happens in the professional practice of ﬁnancial
rating. The rating of an institution is revised after the occurrence of events regarding the capital structure of the institution itself or the counterparties to
which it is exposed.
12 The probability to trigger the reaction of the counterparties equals the probability that a (accumulated) shock is beyond a given threshold (see also
proof of Proposition 1). This is simply the probability mass in the left tail of the probability distribution, q0 ¼Fð0,sz ,EszÞ ¼Fð0,s,EsÞ, where Fðm,s,xÞ





, the probability of a penalty (conditional to no prior penalty) is unchanged.









































Fig. 1. Default probability Pf as a function of the diversiﬁcation degree k. (Left) Comparison of presence (solid line) and absence (dotted line) of the
ﬁnancial acceleration. The dot-dashed line represents the values of the term aqðkÞ in Eq. (11). Parameters setting: E¼ 1, s¼ 0:25, a¼ 0:055. (Right)
Illustration of dependence on a. Parameters: E¼ 1, s¼ 0:25, a varies in [0.01 0.15] in steps of 0.005.
S. Battiston et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1121–11411128diminished by her level k of diversiﬁcation. The same holds for an OTC derivative contract if each counterparty requires a
ﬁxed amount of additional collateral after she observes the signal about i’s robustness.
Proposition 1 holds again with sz replacing s, as well as the good approximation, in terms of expected ﬁrst passage
time, between the jump-diffusion model and the model with constant drift. We thus add the drift term aq in Eq. (9) and
we obtain the ﬁnal formulation of our model
dZiðtÞ ¼ ðZ iZiðtÞaqðszðkÞ,a,EÞÞ dtþsz dzi ð11Þ
Notice that q depends now also on the degree k of diversiﬁcation, via sz.




, Proposition 1 implies now that the average effect of the trend reinforcement, aq, depends on the




. In particular, it increases with k up to an asymptot, as shown in Fig. 1 (left, dashed curve). The
curve means that, for small k, it is unlikely that an agent suffering a decrease in robustness will be penalized and will incur
in a further decrease of robustness. However, as k increases, sz decreases and the ﬂuctuation magnitude gets dominated by
the magnitude of the effect of the penalty, a. It becomes thus more and more likely that an agent suffering a decrease in
robustness will be penalized further in the next quarter. Notice that the magnitude of the instantaneous effect of the
penalty remains always a. It is only its average effect to become stronger because it occurs more often.
In summary, an increasing level of diversiﬁcation k in the network is initially beneﬁcial to the agents. Indeed, smaller
ﬂuctuations on asset portfolio values imply longer time to default. However, beyond a certain level of k, whenever an agent
suffers a relatively large negative shock, the effect of trend reinforcement steps in.
A crucial point here is that, regardless the diversiﬁcation level, the probability of occurrence of the ﬁrst large negative
shock is always the same, thus there is no ex ante disadvantage from a high diversiﬁcation. However, with higher
diversiﬁcation the trend reinforcement is more frequent because of the different balance between penalty and
ﬂuctuations, implying a shorter time to default. This ambiguous effect of diversiﬁcation is an unforeseen external effect
of the reaction of i’s counterparties which eventually hits back all the agents.
2.4. The interpretation of acceleration in a network context
Our interpretation of trend reinforcement in Eq. (10) starts from the assumption that each agent reacts to a negative
change in the robustness of a partner belonging to the same neighborhood generated by idiosyncratic Gaussian shocks to
all the nodes in the neighborhood only when the negative change exceeds, in absolute value, a certain threshold, i.e. only
when the performance of the agent becomes poor. The performance is poor when the change is not only negative but
negative beyond normal, with a normal or acceptable loss to be deﬁned as one standard deviation from the mean of the
idiosyncratic shock. If the loss is contained within the normal/acceptable level (that is if it is smaller than the threshold)
there will be no reaction (and punishment) on the part of the neighbors.
The acceptable or ‘‘normal’’ loss, in turn, is decreasing with density. In fact, the idiosyncratic shock to each agent is
drawn from a (time invariant) distribution with variance s. Each shock is then spread to the neighborhood through credit




, hence it is
decreasing with density. If the network becomes more dense (i.e. if the network is characterized by higher k) the riskiness
of an agent for each partner will become smaller. This is straightforward and descends from the fact that each agent is
discharging part of the idiosyncratic shock on the partners: the more numerous is the neighborhood, the smaller the
fraction of the shock to a partner which reaches the other partners. When an agent is hit by a negative shock and records
an abnormal loss, i.e. a decrease of robustness beyond the threshold, she sends a signal of ‘‘poor’’ performance to her
partners. If the average partner is relatively diversiﬁed (i.e. the network is characterized by a high k), the performance is
considered ‘‘poor’’ when the loss reaches a magnitude smaller than the one which triggers the rating of poor performance
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and the riskiness in turn is
decreasing with density.
This interpretation can be complemented by the following arguments:(1) We can assume that more diversiﬁed agents will take on higher levels of debt ﬁnancing. This conjecture is based on a




. This new notion of riskiness is
based on prospective ﬁnancial fragility: an agent becomes more risky (more ﬁnancially fragile in the future) in the eyes
of her neighbors when she becomes more diversiﬁed. This is a possible complementary cause of the negative
relationship between the threshold and connectivity k. We have no speciﬁc reference to support this conjecture. It is
empirically plausible, however, that a more dense network of credit inter-linkages makes the market for loans thicker
and credit more easily accessible to ﬁrms, thereby boosting leverage. For instance one may argue that the practice of
multiple lending relationships among a ﬁrm and a certain number of banks makes easier for ﬁrms to get into debt and
therefore there should be a relationship from connectivity to leverage and ﬁnancial fragility. These issues have been
explored by Ongena and Smith (2000) who conclude that there is a positive correlation between ﬁnancial fragility and
the practice of multiple lending relationship.(2) We can assume that the signal implied by poor results at one ﬁrm has stronger impact for the likelihood that others are
in trouble if the degree of interconnectedness is greater. This follows from the simple fact that there are more ﬁrms
connected to the agent having a poor performance in the case of a high k.
Both factors will lead neighboring ﬁrms to respond more sensitively to ‘‘poor’’ reported results by any single ﬁrm with
whom they do business.2.5. The probability of individual defaults
We now analyze the impact of interdependence and ﬁnancial acceleration on the probability of bankruptcy. In a
nutshell, we ﬁnd (not surprisingly) that, in the absence of ﬁnancial acceleration, the diversiﬁcation of individual risk
always yields a reduction of individual default probability. In contrast, as soon as we include the ﬁnancial acceleration, this
is not necessarily true. Financial acceleration, as shown by Proposition 1, generates an average negative drift in the
stochastic trajectory of the robustness that more than offsets the positive effect of diversiﬁcation. As we have noted, the
probability of individual bankruptcy can be investigated in terms of the ﬁrst passage time of the SDE. For Eq. (11), it is
possible to compute analytically the mean passage time of robustness at 0 and hence the probability of bankruptcy, to
ascertain more precisely how it is affected by diversiﬁcation.
The probability Pf that, at any given time t, an agent goes bankrupt is the expected frequency with which, over time, the
robustness of the agent hits the bankruptcy threshold. Since default frequency is the inverse of the time between
successive events, the probability of bankruptcy can be measured as the inverse of the mean ﬁrst passage time, Tf, of the
stochastic process describing the evolution of the robustness, Pf ¼ 1=Tf . The mean ﬁrst passage time of a stochastic process
in the presence of both a reﬂective and an absorbing barrier can be computed with standard approaches (Gardiner, 2004),
leading to the following proposition.





given by Eq. (4). Denote the average probability of bankruptcy of an individual agent as Pf. Then1. In the absence of ﬁnancial acceleration ðh¼ 0,8tÞ, Pf decreases with the degree k of risk diversiﬁcation as Pf ðkÞ ¼ s2=k.
2. In the presence of ﬁnancial acceleration ðho0 (tÞ







ð12Þ3. As function of k, Pf(k) is not, in general, decreasing monotonically and it has a unique minimum for several parameter settings.
The ﬁrst result is due to the fact that in the absence of ﬁnancial acceleration the evolution of the robustness can be
approximated with a Brownian motion. In this case, the mean ﬁrst passage time through an absorptive barrier is inversely
proportional to the variance of the random steps. This implies the intuitive result that the probability of bankruptcy
decreases with the average number of counterparties. In other words, the credit network is more stable the larger is the
number of contracts among agents. These results are in line with the classical result of Allen and Gale (2001).
Concerning the second and third result, the dashed curve in Fig. 1 (left) represents the absolute value of the drift, aq. As
discussed in the previous section, for small k, ﬂuctuations of Z are comparable in magnitude with a, thus the trend reinforcement
occurs only seldom and, on average, the drift is small. As k increases, agents tend to remain trapped in a sequence of trend
reinforcements, which corresponds, on average, to a stronger drift. As shown in Fig. 1 (right) the probability of default does not
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acceleration, the probability of default, Pf, turns out to have a minimum as a function of k, in a whole range of values of a and s.
This implies that risk diversiﬁcation becomes at some point counterproductive and increases the probability of default.
The models in which the mathematical structures exhibit ‘‘convexities’’, in the relevant sense, diversiﬁcation will
naturally improve performance. Trend reinforcement (acceleration) can be viewed as introducing a natural non-convexity.
Thus, while this result is at odds with the widespread presumption in favor of diversiﬁcation, it is consistent with several
recent works (Wagner, 2010; Castiglionesi and Navarro, 2010; Stiglitz, 2010, forthcoming) which show that full
diversiﬁcation is not optimal.
2.5.1. Positive feedbacks versus ﬂuctuations
In our model, ﬁnancial acceleration is nothing else than a positive feedback loop that, let alone, would eventually lead
the agents towards default. Fluctuations have a twofold effect. On the one hand they can contribute to the path of the
agent towards default. On the other hand they can cut the loop of the positive feedback. Excessive risk sharing, by
decreasing the ﬂuctuations, eventually prevents to cut the loop of the positive feedback, leaving the agent exposed to the
effect of acceleration alone.
Of course this effect holds only if the magnitude of the penalty, a, does not scale down with k, or at least if it does so




. We have assumed a constant, which is an interesting and not
uncommon case, as discusses earlier.
The model essentially shows, analytically and in a relatively simple framework, that in the presence of a potential
instability towards default, ﬂuctuations do not necessarily increase instability. Instead ﬂuctuations can help to mitigate the
instability by cutting the loop of the positive feedback.
2.6. Coupled dynamics and systemic defaults
Since the evolution of robustness in Eq. (11) is described by a linear system, the distribution pðZiðtÞÞ of the values of
robustness of a given agent i across different realizations of the process is Gaussian (Gardiner, 2004). We cannot say the
same for the probability distribution pðZ,tÞ of the values of robustness across agents in a given realization at a given time.
In general, the two distributions may not be the same. The latter is the one we need in order to estimate the probability
that, conditional to the default of one agent, a certain number of other agents fail too.
However, via the Ito lemma one can derive a scalar SDE for the variance vðtÞ ¼PjðZjðtÞZðtÞÞ2=n of the robustness
across the agents at any time.13 Under some regularity conditions (i.e. the graph has to be primitive, Seneta, 2006), the
expected value of the variance tends exponentially fast over time to the value ðs2=kÞðs2=nÞ. Therefore, apart for the
correction term s2=n, the variance of the robustness across agents coincides with the variance of the shocks at the level of
individual agents. In other words, over time, after a transient phase, the trajectories of ZiðtÞ at the different agents evolve
staying within a sort of bundle of constant width. This is due to the mean reversion term,
P
jWijZjZi, in the dynamics. The
width of the bundle decreases as k increases, so that trajectories of robustness remain more and more close to each other.
This increase of correlation with the diversiﬁcation has two implications concerning the systemic defaults.
The ﬁrst implication is that the probability that several agents fail, conditional to the default of at least one of them,
grows with k. The effect of correlation on systemic defaults have been investigated in Allen et al. (2011) where,
connectivity k is ﬁxed but correlation depends on the network architecture. Notice that, in our case, even if the individual
default probability Pf were constant with k, the correlation implies that the probability of multiple defaults grows with the
level k of diversiﬁcation, provided of course that the network satisﬁes the regularity conditions mentioned above.
The second implication is that, when the default of an agent has external effects on the connected agents (effect which we
have not taken into account so far), we can expect the probability of multiple defaults to grow even faster with the level k of
diversiﬁcation. The reason is that if the default of one agent decreases the ﬁnancial robustness of the creditors, since these must
be also close to the default barrier (due to the high correlation to the defaulted one) they are now even more likely to fail. In
order to quantify this effect, in the next section we introduce in the model a default cascade dynamics.
3. Bankruptcy cascades
In the dynamics we have introduced in the previous section, the change in robustness of an agent is affected at any
point in time by the robustness of the counterparties. In this section, we introduce a different dynamics, in which the
default of an agent has a negative external effect on the robustness of its counterparties. If some of these counterparties, in
turn, default on their own counterparties, this can trigger a cascade of defaults, a phenomenon often referred to as domino
effect. Our cascade dynamics, although stylized, is conceptually very similar to the well established framework of
Eisenberg and Noe (2001). Formally it turns out to be similar also to the dynamics introduced more recently in Gai and
Kapadia (2010), although there some important differences in the methodology applied to solve for the size of the13 This is a standard application of the Ito Lemma (Oksendal and Karsten, 1998). A proof is available from the authors upon request.
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level of diversiﬁcation across the agents, in particular when cascades are considered in combination with the dynamics of
robustness subject to acceleration.
A formal way to deal with the effects that payment default has on the cash ﬂow of the counterparties is the ﬁctitious
default sequence introduced by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) with the objective of estimating the value of claims when agents
are connected in networks of obligations containing circular chains (e.g., A lends to B, B lends to C, C lends to A). The idea is
that the default of an agent decreases the value of the assets of each counterparty in the interbank market, and if the asset
value becomes smaller than the liabilities, the counterparty in turn defaults, thus triggering a cascade. As shown in Gai and
Kapadia (2010), when exposures among agents are equally weighted and thus risk sharing is maximized, only two
variables matter in the cascade dynamics. The ﬁrst is the fraction of defaulting counterparties of each bank and the second
is the default threshold, which varies across banks and depends on the initial value of assets and liabilities of the bank.
Here, we assume that, as a result of the default of a counterparty j, the robustness Zi of agent i decreases by an amount
proportional to the relative exposure Wij, consistently with the network of liabilities described in Section 2.2. Formally the







where the function wjðtÞ indicates if the agent j has defaulted at any previous time 1, . . . ,t
wjðtÞ ¼
1 if Zjðt0Þo0, (t0rt,
0 else
(
For convenience with respect to what comes in the following, we have denoted the time variable as t, so to distinguish it
from the variable t used in the dynamics of Eq. (11). The parameter a determines the extent of the loss caused by the
default of j to its counterparties. In the hypothesis that there is no asset recovery during the development of the cascade
we set a¼1. Notice that, if we assume also maximal risk sharing, i.e. Wij ¼ 1=ki, the dynamics above implies a decrease of
robustness proportional to the fraction of defaulting counterparties of i, exactly as in Gai and Kapadia (2010). One
difference is that here the default threshold is ﬁxed at 0, while the initial level of robustness differs across agents.
The cascading process just described is deterministic and terminates for sure after a ﬁnite number of steps smaller than
the number of agents (Kleinberg, 2007). In the ﬁnal state, a certain fraction s of the agents has defaulted.
Notice that this approach is conservative in the sense that the aggregate loss caused by each defaulting agent to her
counterparties coincides with their exposures. This is unlike other models of contagion in ﬁnancial systems (Stiglitz, 2010),
as well as models of innovation diffusion and disease contagion (Jackson and Rogers, 2007), where the aggregate loss
increases with the number of contacts, because there is an independent probability of contagion associated to each link.3.1. The size of a cascade
The number of defaults at the end of the cascade process can be computed under some simplifying hypotheses. The
technique consists in deriving a recursive equation for the cumulative fraction of defaults in the system as a function of the
cumulative fraction of defaults at the previous step. Solving for the stable ﬁxed point of such equation yields the size of the
cascade.15
The recursive function depends of course on the initial distribution of robustness across agents. If agents have little
robustness, the cascade tends to be larger because the default of some is more likely to cause the default of others. Based
on the discussion in Section 2.6, we will assume in the following that the initial distribution of robustness when the
cascade starts can be approximated by a Gaussian with variance s2=k. However, a similar computation could be carried out
for other probability distributions of robustness. For our purposes, we ﬁx the variance of individual shocks s2 and we focus
on the diversiﬁcation k as a varying parameter. The result about the cascade size is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Consider the process of Eq. (13). Assume the network of ﬁrms is a regular random graph with degree k. Assume
also the initial probability distribution of robustness is Gaussian with mean m and variance s2Z, pðZ,t¼ 0Þ  Gaussðm,sZÞ. Let
Fm,sZ denote the cumulative probability distribution of Z and s0 denote the fraction of ﬁrms whose robustness is below zero at
the beginning of the process. Then1.1
1The fraction s of defaults at the end of the cascade process is the solution of the equation
s¼maxfs0,Fðs,m,sZÞg ð14Þ4 See also Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) for an alternative model of bankruptcy cascades.
5 This method differs from the graph generating function approach used in Gai and Kapadia (2010).



































Fig. 2. (Left) Plot of R.H.S. of the ﬁxed point Eq. (14) for the cascade size. Examples for s¼ 0:25 and k¼10. Form¼0.05 andm¼0.2 the only stable ﬁxed point
is s¼1 (complete collapse). For m¼0.4 there are two stable ﬁxed points, but the initial fraction of defaults is almost zero, so the dynamics can only reach the
left stable ﬁxed point. (Right) The fraction s of defaults is plotted in gray scale as a function of diversiﬁcation degree k and average robustness m. In the gray
area cascades are large (over 90% of defaults). In the white area cascades are small (below 5% of defaults). The top left inset refers to the initial distribution with
m¼0.2 (see curve in left panel): no cascade occurs. The bottom right inset refers to the initial distribution with m¼0.4: a full cascade occurs.











ð15Þ2. A stable ﬁxed point always exists.The proof rests on the assumption that the defaults of the neighbors of a given agent are statistically independent, so
that we can describe the probability of multiple defaults among the neighbors of an agent with a binomial distribution.
This assumption is strictly valid only when there are few defaults in the system. However, when there are instead many
defaults, the result shows that eventually the cascade involves the whole network. Thus, the presence of correlation
becomes irrelevant and the result is still correct.
As an example, Fig. 2 (left) shows a plot of the R.H.S. of Eq. (14) as a function of the cascade size, for some speciﬁc parameters.
Notice that with average robustness m¼0.4 there are two stable ﬁxed points and the lower one is reached, corresponding to no
cascade. After decreasingm to 0.2, there is only one stable ﬁxed point at s¼1, corresponding to full cascade. Proposition 4 implies
that there are only two regimes, one with only small cascades and one with only large cascades. Indeed, in Fig. 2 (right) the size of
the cascade is plotted as a function of both k and m. In the gray area cascades are large (over 90% of defaults). In the white area
cascades are small (below 5% of defaults). The two insets refer to two of the cases illustrated in Fig. 2 (left). If the initial
distribution of robustness has a mean m close to 0 and a large variance (small k), then obviously many ﬁrms have defaulted
already at the beginning, when the cascade process starts (see lower inset of the ﬁgure). They affect other ﬁrms, many of which
have also small robustness since the mean of the distribution is low, thus the resulting cascade is large.
Notice that, for any ﬁxedm, increasing diversiﬁcation is beneﬁcial in the sense that at some point the cascade size drops
to 0. This is because as k increases, the width of the distribution shrinks so that the fraction of agents initially defaulting
becomes very small and very few or none of the other agents is weak enough to be dragged into a cascade. As a
comparison, Gai and Kapadia (2010) ﬁnd that contagion occurs in a window of levels of risk diversiﬁcation, but for
diversiﬁcation large enough, both the frequency and the extent of the contagion go to zero.
3.2. Interplay of robustness evolution and cascades. Implications on systemic risk
Since systemic risk is the probability that a large fraction of agents in the ﬁnancial system fail at the same time, it is
now crucial to understand how frequently the system is found in the conditions that lead to a large cascade. Hence, we aim
at estimating the probability Pc of occurrence of large cascades, i.e. cascades involving at least a given fraction sc 2 ½0;1 of the
system. In doing so, we want to take into account that robustness is not a static quantity and that the distribution of
robustness that is likely to be realized at the beginning of a cascade evolves in time.
When banks default on their obligations and trigger a cascade, this occurs at a time scale (e.g., days) which is much
faster than the evolution of robustness described by the dynamics introduced in Section 2. We thus assume a repeated
two-stage process in which robustness evolves according to the diffusion dynamics of Eq. (11) until a default occurs. At
this point the cascade dynamics of Eq. (13) starts, taking as initial condition the current distribution of robustness that
resulted from the diffusion.
Systemic risk can be thus seen as the result of two factors: the size of a cascade which depends on the initial
distribution of robustness, and the frequency by which the system visits the distribution of robustness that leads to such a
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average robustness m is below the boundary of the region of large cascades (in gray). Recall that the values of s and k are
constant during the evolution of ZiðtÞ. Thus, the expected time it takes during the evolution for the average robustness to
reach the value m can be approximated by the ﬁrst passage time at Z¼m of a representative trajectory of robustness
starting from Z¼ 1. This approximation makes sense because of the mean reversion which keeps trajectories close to each
other, as discussed earlier. Therefore, in this approach, the probability PðcÞf of cascades larger than sc is obtained as the
inverse of the ﬁrst passage time at a value m such that a cascade larger than sc is triggered. The probability of large
cascades estimated in this way turns out to be a non-monotonic function of the risk diversiﬁcation. In other words, similar
to the individual default probability, even the systemic default probability displays an intermediate optimal degree of
diversiﬁcation beyond which a further diversiﬁcation becomes detrimental. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Consider the cascade process of Eq. (13). Assume the initial distribution of robustness is Gaussian
pðZ,t¼ 0Þ ¼ Gaussðm,sÞ. Assume the network of ﬁrms is a regular random graph with degree k. In mean-ﬁeld approximation,















Sðk,mÞ is the cascade size solution of Eq: ð14Þ ð19Þ
As a function of k, Pc is not, in general, decreasing monotonically, and it has a unique minimum for several parameter settings.
As shown by the plot in Fig. 3, the probability of large cascades is not decreasing monotonically with k. On the contrary
it exhibits a marked minimum for intermediate values of k. Notice that, as shown in Fig. 2, the cascade size s has essentially
two ranges of values: so0:05 (i.e. 5% of agents fail) in the regime of small cascades and s40:9 (i.e. 90% of agents fail) in
the regime of large cascades. Therefore, the second point of the above proposition actually holds independently of the
value sc taken as deﬁnition of ‘‘large cascade’’, as long as sc40:05.
Finally, the results of the paper can be summarized in the following conclusive corollary.




ﬁguThe systemic risk is in general not monotonically decreasing with the risk diversiﬁcation.
2. With larger diversiﬁcation, the ﬁnancial system is more likely to be near the threshold at which large cascades occur.
3. At least in some intervals of the range of the parameters involved, there exist an optimal level of systemic risk, which does not
coincide with full diversiﬁcation.
















































. 3. (Left) Probability Pc of occurrence of large cascades as a function of risk diversiﬁcation k for some values of the intensity a of ﬁnancial acceleration.
ht) Expected time Tc to large default cascades plotted in color code (log scale) as a function of k and a. The scale on the color bar indicates the range of
expected time to default in the time units of Eq. (11). Values of the parameters: E¼ 1 and s¼ 0:25. a varies in steps of 0.0001. The isoclines in black
w that for any given a, by increasing k the expected time to default has an intermediate maximum. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
re caption, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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In this paper, we have characterized the evolution over time of a credit network in the most general terms as a system
of coupled stochastic processes, each describing the dynamics of individual ﬁnancial robustness. The coupling comes from
the fact that agents assets are other agents’ liabilities. Thus, each agent’s ﬁnancial robustness is inter-dependent with the
ﬁnancial robustness of the counterparties through risk sharing as well as external effects arising from defaults.
Our goal is to investigate possible reasons why diversiﬁcation may not deliver the expected beneﬁts. It is relatively easy
to do so by assuming a disease-like contagion, or a cost that is supra-linear in the number of joint defaults. Here, instead,
we have provided an explanation based on a milder assumption. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial acceleration, i.e. the positive
feedback of ﬁnancial robustness on itself, is a sufﬁcient condition. It eventually more than offsets the stabilizing role of risk
sharing and ampliﬁes the effects of a shock to a single agent of the network, leading to a full ﬂedged systemic crisis. The
relationship between the probability of default, both individual as well as systemic, and connectivity is U-shaped. If
connectivity is already high, a further increase may have the perverse effect of amplifying ﬁnancial distress through the
ﬁnancial acceleration and to increase systemic risk.
The present work aims to provide a basic framework and can be extended in several directions. First of all one could
investigate other variants of the mechanisms of both distress propagation and ﬁnancial acceleration to possibly extend the
validity of these results. Second, one could study the effect of different network architectures. In particular, skewed degree
distribution are known to play a role in spreading phenomena, as shown in technological diffusion on social networks
(Jackson and Rogers, 2007). Another open question in our context concerns the systemic risk of a network organized in
clusters which are densely connected internally but loosely connected among each other. Whether there exists an optimal
level of clusterization would have important implications on the debate about the role and design of globalization (Stiglitz,
forthcoming). Finally, one could model the set of contracts among agents as an endogenously evolving network (Jackson,
2008; Goyal, 2007; Castiglionesi and Navarro, 2010; Allen et al., 2011) in which each agent decide strategically which ties
to form or to severe, based on the expected utility they provide.
Appendix A. Proofs of PropositionsProof of Proposition 1. We derive a recursive expression of the probability qt that the ﬁnancial acceleration takes place in
a given discrete time t 2 N , that is, qt ¼ PfhiðtÞ ¼ag. For the variation in robustness over the interval ½t1,t, by neglecting




















represents the accumulated Wiener shock over the interval ½t1,t. Then,
qt ¼ PfhiðtÞ ¼ag ¼ PfZiðtdtÞZiðt1dtÞoEsg ðA:3Þ






There are two possible cases now. In the ﬁrst case, it is hðt1Þ ¼a, occurs with probability qtdt . In the second case, it is
hðt1Þ ¼ 0, which occurs with probability 1qtdt . In both cases, the probability that z is smaller than a certain value x is
given by the standard cumulative Gaussian distribution at x, FðxÞ, because z is a Gaussian stochastic variable with zero














where F is the cumulative distribution function of the Gaussian. To show that the ﬁxed point is stable we proceed as
follows. Denote the R.H.S. of Eq. (A.3) as f ðqÞ ¼ qt1F2þð1qt1ÞF1. Notice that both cumulative distributions F1 and F2
lay in 0;1½ for ﬁnite values of the parameters. Since f is linear in q and f ð0Þ40, a unique stable ﬁxed point exists iff
df=dqo1. This is always veriﬁed because df=dq¼F2F1o1. &
Proof of Proposition 2. In the proof of Proposition 3 the ﬁrst passage time is derived in the case with generic
diversiﬁcation level k. In the context of the present proposition take simply k¼1 and probability q as in Eq. (A.3). Both
terms of the ﬁrst passage time in Eq. (A.11) are decreasing with a, hence the conclusion. &
S. Battiston et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1121–1141 1135Proof of Proposition 3. (1) The mean ﬁrst passage time of a random walk with variance s2r is known to be Tf ¼ 1=s2r . We




and we obtain Pf ðkÞ ¼ 1=TðkÞ ¼ s2=k.

























In our case, both the drift and diffusion terms are constant: AðxÞ ¼ A¼aq and BðxÞ ¼ B¼ s2=k. The computation of the
integral proceeds as follows:








































In the context of our model it is a¼0, b¼1. Moreover, we assume x¼1, which implies that ﬁrms are created with the
highest robustness. This is a conservative hypothesis with respect to the result which we will obtain. Substituting for the










Bearing in mind that q¼ qðkÞ, the derivative of the mean ﬁrst passage time with respect to the degree k can now be






























































ðf 0ðf 1þ f 2Þþ f 2Þ ðA:12Þ
where





































, f 1 ¼
2a
s2
ðqþkq0Þkq2, f 2 ¼ q2þ2kqq0 ðA:16Þ
In order to determine in general the existence and the value of the maxima of T(k), we solve the equation TðkÞ ¼ 0, with
TðkÞ00o0. Since the expression contains the error function, the solution of the equation is necessarily numerical. We ﬁx the
parameter E¼ f1;2g and we vary ðs,aÞ in ½0:05,1  ½0:05,1. The results shown here refer to a step size of 0.001.
However, the results were unaffected by using even ﬁner resolutions. For each pair ðs,aÞ we determine the values of k where
T 0ðkÞ changes from positive to negative sign. The idea is illustrated in Fig. A1 (left) for a ﬁxed parameter set, as an example. The
functional dependency of T and T 0 on k displays a non-monotonic behavior. In particular, in the inset, T 0 crosses the value of
zero from above in the point of maximum (indicated by an arrow). The general result is illustrated in Fig. A2 (left). For each pair
ðs,aÞ in the explored grid we always ﬁnd a unique maximum. However, the point of maximum has to be larger than 1, to be a
meaningful level of diversiﬁcation. The gray area indicates the region where the maximum of T occurs at k¼1. In the white area
it occurs at 14k41. As it can be seen, ars is a sufﬁcient condition to have existence and uniqueness of a maximum at
k41. Fig. A2 (right) shows the value of the optimal degree as a function of s,a. This is typically smaller than 30 but it grows
fast to larger values if the intensity a of the ﬁnancial acceleration is very small.
The implication of the result are further illustrated in Fig. A1 (right). The value of s is ﬁxed and the dependence of Tf on k
shows a point of maximum for each value of a, as indicated by the isoclines. The existence of a maximum for Tf implies a
minimum of the probability Pf of default. The procedure employed samples the parameter space at discrete values and thus
does not provide a proof that for any value in the explored range there exists a maximum for Tf. The analysis shows, by
existence, that there are very many parameter values where this is the case. Because Tf is continuous in a, with continuous
derivatives for a40, one could conjecture the existence of a maximum of Tf at least in the range of most interest to the model,















































Fig. A1. (Left) Dependency on the degree k of the mean ﬁrst passage time T(k) (solid line) and its derivative TðkÞ0 (dashed line). Parameter values:
a¼ 0:025, E¼ 1, s¼ 0:15. (Right) Expected time to default plotted in color code (log scale) as a function of k and a. The scale on the color bar indicates the
range of the expected time to default in the time units of Eq. (11). Values of the parameters: E¼ 1 and s¼ 0:25. a varies in steps of 0.0001. The isoclines in
black show that for any given a, by increasing k the expected time to default has an intermediate maximum. (For interpretation of the references to color
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Fig. A2. Left: Number of maxima of T(k). For each pair of values s,a the color code illustrates the number of values of kwhere the derivative T 0ðkÞ changes
from positive to negative values. In the inset, T 0 crosses the value of zero from above in the point of maximum (indicated by an arrow). Right: Value of k in
the point of maxima of T(k) for each pair of values of the parameters s,a. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)














where dcj ðtÞ ¼ 1 iff j has failed at any time in ½0,t. We ask what is the cumulative fraction of agents that have failed so far at
time t. This is








For simplicity, we assume that the network is a regular graph with degree k. Whether a given agent i fails by the time step
tþ1 depends on the number kf of the neighbors that have already failed, out of the total number k of neighbors. At time
step tþ1, the possible events are kf ¼
Pk
j ¼ 1 d
c
j ðtÞ ¼ 1;2, . . . ,k. In each of these events, the probability that agent i fails
depends on the initial value of its robustness. Assume all defaults that have occurred so far are uncorrelated across agents.
Then, they follow a binomial distribution, Prfkf defaults among k neighborsg ¼ ð kkf Þp
kf ð1pÞkkf , where p is the probability
that any given agent has failed so far. In the limit of a large network it is p¼ nðtÞ. Finally, we need to take into account that














where s0 is the initial fraction of defaults. This is a recursive equation of the type nðtþ1Þ ¼ FðnðtÞÞ. Once the probability
distribution of Z is speciﬁed, the ﬁxed points are the solutions of n¼ FðnÞ. For example, in the case of regular graph, with Z






































Notice that FðnÞZs0 with s040 strictly for mo1 and s40. Since in addition F(n) is non-decreasing, there exists at least
one stable ﬁxed point. There maybe more than one but what matters here is only the smallest stable ﬁxed point s with
sZs0. The equation above can be solved numerically with arbitrary precision for any choice of the parameters. The results
are shown in Fig. 2.
In general it would also be possible to account for heterogeneous degree distribution. This requires, however, a more
extended analytical treatment that goes beyond the objective of this paper. &
Proof of Proposition 5. Let us ﬁx the amplitude s of the shocks. The probability Pc that a fraction c of agents fail in the
same period, possibly due to a cascade, can be computed as follows. We use the same general result on mean ﬁrst passage
time described in proof of Proposition 4, Eq. (A.8). In the present context, we are interested in the ﬁrst passage time at the




















The probability that over time the robustness following Eq. (11) reaches the value m is given by the 1=Tðk,mÞ. In a mean
ﬁeld approach we take this as the probability that the average robustness Z in the system reaches the value m.
On the other hand, the solution Sðk,mÞ of Eq. (14) gives the expected size of the cascade occurring when the average
robustness in the system reaches the value m. We are interested now in the mean ﬁrst passage time TcðkÞ to reach the




S. Battiston et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1121–11411138Consequently, PcðkÞ ¼ 1=TcðkÞ is the probability of occurrence of a cascade larger than c, which is a possible measure of
systemic risk. The function of TcðkÞ in Eq. (A.25) cannot be expressed in closed form. However, it can be computed
numerically with arbitrary precision for any choice of the parameters a, s, E. As an example, Fig. 2 (left) shows the
dependence of Tc on k for given parameter values. The curve displays a maximum, which implies a minimum for the
probability PcðkÞ.
Differently from what done in the proof of Proposition 3, here there is no closed-form expression for the derivative of
TcðkÞ, and we thus compute numerically the point of maximum directly from the values of the function TcðkÞ. We do so for
all values of a varying in the interval ½0:001,0:1 with steps of width 0.001, and for ﬁxed values E¼ 1;2, s¼ 0:4 and
sc¼0.25. Notice that, as already mentioned in Section 3.2, the result is very robust with respect to sc in virtue of the two
regimes of cascades. As an illustration of the procedure, in Fig. 3 (right) the values of Tc are plotted as a function of k and a
in the range of interest. It is apparent that for all values of a sampled in the interval there is one global maximum of the
expected time to large cascades Tc as a function of the degree k of risk diversiﬁcation. In other words, there is a value of
optimal connectivity degree as a function of a, which grows for decreasing values of a.
As before, this procedure does not allow to claim that there is a maximum for any possible value in the sampled interval.
It proves by existence that there are very many parameter settings where this is the case. Given the ﬁne resolution of our
sampling, this is a quite reasonable conjecture. &
Appendix B. Numerical simulations
Let us refer to Eq. (1) as Model 1, or jump-diffusion model, and to Eq. (5) as Model 2, or drift-diffusion model. In this
section we show by Monte Carlo computer simulations that the expected ﬁrst passage time in Model 2 is a good
approximation of the expected ﬁrst passage time (MFPT) in Model 1.
Following the simple Euler discretization scheme, we compute the variation of the variable Z, over steps s, each of size
D. Jumps occur, possibly, only every n steps, with n 2 N and with Dn¼ 1. We can then reduce the step size by increasing n.

















where modðs,nÞ is the remainder of the division of s by n. Notice that when modðs,nÞ ¼ 0, then sD is right before the step
in which the conditional shock in s can possibly occur, while snD is right before the conditional shock in sn. Thus the
difference is affected by the previous conditional shock at sn, but not yet by the conditional shock that will occur in s. The
scheme above is illustrative of the method but it is not meant to be a pseudo-code of the computer program. We also
implement a reﬂective barrier at 1 and an absorbing barrier at 0, as in the model.
We run Monte Carlo simulations of sample paths of the process, starting from 1, and we measure the time step T at
which Z becomes 0 or negative. At this point we start a new sample path. We repeat this procedure a number Nruns of times
and we take the average time across runs. We make sure that the simulation time is long enough that in all runs the
process eventually exit from the lower barrier. We then compute the mean T across all the runs.
We compare the theoretical value of the drift-model with the empirical value of the simulated jump-diffusion model.
Fig. B1 reports the results of MFPT with D¼ 0:0001 and Nruns ¼ 1000. The theoretical value in red are computed from
Eq. (A.11), with the expression for q(k) in Eq. (A.6), as obtained in Proposition 1. The empirical value is in blue. The dotted
blue curves represent the average T plus(minus) the standard deviation of T across runs. Notice the large standard
deviation reﬂecting a great variability from run to run in the region of intermediate k. And yet notice the good agreement
of the mean (blue) with the theory. This picture shows that in the intermediate k regime because the trend reinforcement
is weak, q51 and the average drift is small aq5a¼ 0:01. Thus, both the red and the blue curves are close to the case with
virtually no drift (upper green curve). In contrast, with large k, q-1 and the average drift is close to value of the constant-
drift a (lower green curve).
The systematic study of MFPT for Model 1 poses some computational challenges if one wants to explore the space of
parameters with ﬁne granularity. Thus Model 2 offers a good tool to do this via an analytical approximation.
Appendix C. A simple calibration exercise
An accurate calibration of the model is beyond the scope of this paper. However it is worthwhile to illustrate how a
simple exercise can be carried out and what kind of conclusions can be drawn.
The ﬁrst challenge in the calibration of our model is the scarcity of data on exposures among ﬁnancial institutions,
which is highly conﬁdential information. In particular, exposures among global institutions are not known, although they



















σ = 0.1, α = 0.03, ε = 1, τ = 1
Fig. B1. Mean ﬁrst passage time T computed with D¼ 0:0001 and Nruns ¼ 1000. For all curves, s¼ 0:1. Red curve: Model 2 (drift-model), with a¼ 0:03.
Blue curve: simulation of Model 1 (jump-diffusion model) with same a. Blue dotted curves: T7sT . Green upper curve: theoretical value with constant
drift a¼0.0001. Green lower curve: theoretical value with constant drift a¼0.03. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
S. Battiston et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1121–1141 1139connectivity has evolved in the last 10 years and since the unraveling of the ﬁnancial crisis. However, it is simply not
possible to measure accurately the number of relevant connections in the ﬁnancial system.
For instance, some empirical studies of ﬁnancial contagion on national credit networks (Degryse and Nguyen, 2007;
Mistrulli, 2011; Upper and Worms, 2004) do not report information on the connectivity of the network. It should be
emphasized that our model is well suited to be applied to the core of a core–periphery structure because the density of
connections in the core justiﬁes the mean-ﬁeld approach taken in this paper. Empirical work on the FED payment system
(Soramaki et al., 2007) suggests that in the US there is a core–periphery structure. The core comprises 25 among the largest
institutions which are densely connected among each other, with average degree 1178. Similar insight can be obtained
from the network diagrams of Cont et al. (2010), although they do not focus on the core–periphery structure. They report
an average in-degree and out-degree around 8, which increases if one would select the top institutions.
On the other hand, the only available data on potential interdependencies among global players concerns ownership
relations. Recent empirical work has shown that at the global level there is a very marked core–periphery structure with a
tightly knit core (Vitali et al., 2011) comprising the largest global ﬁnancial institutions. Within this set, we have further
selected the global institutions that received ﬁnancial aid through the FED emergency programs in 2008–2009 (Battiston
et al., under revision). We obtained a group of 36 institutions with an average degree 17713.
A second challenge is ﬁnding an empirical ﬁnancial ratio that (1) ﬁts the type of dynamics of Eqs. (11) and (2) for which
time series of suitable length and frequency are available. Moreover, the estimation of the parameters of the dynamics of
our model from such time series is a non-trivial econometric analysis which deserves further work. Here, as an illustrative
exercise, we examined the time series of equity (meant as market capitalization) of the set of 36 institutions selected as
described earlier in a period of 1006 trading days from August of 2007 to July of 2009. After normalizing the equity of each
institution to its own maximum value in time span of the data, each time series varies in the range ð0 1. As shown in
Fig. C1, the time series display an evident negative trend, until they reach a minimum in March 2009 (around trading day
600). It is also evident that the strong correlation across the time series, which not only could come from an exogenous
factors but could also come from the interdependence of the time series. We selected the period August 2007–March 2009
(trading days 1–600) – the decreasing phase – as representative of a situation of ﬁnancial acceleration.
From the time series of each institution, we measured the drift and we took its average value 0.025 across institutions
as an estimate of the parameter a in Eq. (11). From each time series, we measured also the standard deviation of the
returns. We found an average value of 0.02, which we have taken as an estimate of the parameter sz of Eq. (11). In the





sz, we would need the average connectivity. This can be estimated only roughly from the empirical evidences
mentioned above. Notice that the measured volatility could include other additional factors and it is probably
overestimated (see below).
Fig. C1 (right) shows the mean expected passage time as a function of the degree for three different scenarios. In each





¼ 0:06. The optimal average degree is kn ¼ 3:8. Similarly, for k¼25 we obtain s¼ 0:1 and kn ¼ 10:6; for
k¼56.2 we obtain s¼ 0:15 and kn ¼ 23:9. The fact that the volatility is probably overestimated, only accentuate this result,











































Fig. C1. Left: Normalized values of equity across 39 global ﬁnancial institutions beneﬁting from the FED emergency programs in 2008. Right: Theoretical
mean ﬁrst passage time T calibrated on the estimated average values of s and a for the network of such ﬁnancial institutions. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this ﬁgure caption, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
S. Battiston et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1121–11411140because the optimal degree would shift to the left. In other words, the results of the exercise suggest that, given the
observed level of ﬁnancial acceleration and volatility, the system is slightly over diversiﬁed with respect to the
optimal level.
To conclude, we have presented a sketch of how one can carry out a calibration of the model. The results presented here
should be taken only as an illustration what kind of implications could be drawn. A more systematic and careful estimation
of the parameter is needed in order to provide more robust indications.
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